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Often times, a candidate’s attractiveness is directly associated with his clear ideologies and opin-
ions on various policies and social issues. Using the ideas of stochastic differential equations and
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process, we develop a phenomenological model to understand the effect of
(un)clearly communicating a candidate’s stance on policies to the voting public. We will show that,
counter intuitively, there are quantifiable advantages to be vague on one’s stance.
Quantitative analysis of political elections have been a
staple for many years. Models of election are many and
varied, each with its own focus. There is a vast litera-
ture on methods to forecast the elections using tools like
fundamental indicators[1], market indicators[2], Bayesian
methods[3] and even social media strategies [4] and other
general statistical tools [5–7]. Although there is extensive
work on modeling of political dynamics between candi-
dates [8–12], most of the study focus on global/macro
perspective while either neglecting or including the com-
plex effects of individual components (e.g. stances on dif-
ferent policies) as a mean field effect.
In this letter, we develop a quantitative phenomeno-
logical model to understand and analyze the effect of one
such individual component - efficient information flow in
an election/voting system. Information flow is a funda-
mental notion in many areas from physics to quantitative
finance. Whenever a decision is being made on a can-
didate, one typically encounters uncertainties about the
candidate’s stance on various policies. These uncertain-
ties can occur due to various reasons from candidate’s
lack of effective communication to spread of deliberate
misinformation. While qualitatively, inefficient transfer
of information from candidate to public might seem like
a negative effect, we show that there are certain cases
where these inefficiencies are not only advantages, but
also necessary. We use Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equations[13]
to model the time dependent information flow between
the candidate and public. Use of stochastic theory to
model complex elections have also been used by Fenneret
al. [14] to analyze the polls leading up to the UK 2016
EU referendum. We will start by introducing the model,
after which we will explore the properties and effects of
various parameters phenomenologically.
Model : Let us denote the stance of the candidate on
policy p as µ with his own uncertainty on the stance be-
ing σ, where −∞ < µ <∞ with positive values being in
favor for policy and negative values being against. This
could model a variety of situations from social issues to
ideologies. For example, in case of left vs right, a left
leaning moderate candidate might have µ ≈ 0.5, σ ≈ 0.5
with µ > 0 and µ < 0 being left and right respectively.
Now we model the public perceived stance of the candi-
date’s policy at time t during the election to by a random
variable Xt. At the start of election (t = 0) (or the start
of announcing the candidacy), Xt|t=0 = X0 = N (µ0, σ0)
i.e. at t = 0, the public has a predisposed idea on what
the candidate’s stance is with a distribution given by X0.
For instance, X0 = µ0 = 0 would mean that the public
has no idea of what the candidate’s stance is. As time
flows, the candidate’s opinion on p is made clearer though
various information transfer processes like public speech,
social media posts etc. and E [Xt|t→∞] → µ. This sys-
tem is modeled as a solution to a stochastic differential
equation (SDE) given by
dXt = r (µ−Xt) dt+ σdWt, t > 0. (1)
where r is the rate at which the candidate makes his
stance µ clear with a variance of σ ≥ 0. Wt is a standard
Brownian Motion on R. Equation 1 can alternatively be
written in terms of stochastic integral form as
Xt = µ
(
1− e−rt)+ σe−rt ∫ t
0
ersdWs +X0e
−rt, t ≥ 0
(2)
It is trivial to check that (2) is the unique, strong
Markov sollution to (1)[15]. This is Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
Process, which is an extension of Brownian motion with
friction. The important feature of (1), is that the expec-
tation value at time t is given by
E [Xt] = µ
(
1− e−rt)+ e−rtE [X0] , t ≥ 0, (3)
which gives us the required asymptotic Gaussian behav-
ior E [Xt|t→∞] → µ. These type of processes are often
refereed to as mean-reverting processes. Although there
are different generalizations of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Pro-
cess [16], we here choose the vanilla model to introduce
the phenomenology.
In general, the formal solution of (1) is given by Xt =
N (E [Xt] ,Var[Xt]) where
Var[Xt] =
σ2
2r
(
1− e−2rt)+ e−rt Var [X0] (4)
1 shows a numerical simulation of Xt for values of
µ = 2 (positive stance) and µ = −2 (negative stance)
for 10 different stochastic curves starting with an ini-
tial distribution of N (0, 2) in green and red respectively.
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2Black lines show the evolution of mean according to (3).
As one can see, initial idea of candidate’s perspective on
policy is quite spread out which then converges to µ as
time proceeds.
FIG. 1. Sample trajectories of Xt starting from X0 ≈ N (0, 2)
for σ = 0.5, r = 1, (green) µ = 2 and (red) µ = −2
In this model, as seen from (4), Var[Xt] plays the vital
role of how collectively confused the public is about the
candidate’s opinion at any given time t. This is mainly
governed by the variable σ2r . It is interesting to note that
this confusion is not dependent on how strong a negative
or positive stance the candidate takes i.e. µ.
With these notion in mind, we now propose that the
probability that the candidate wins (PT )
Proposition .1 Probability (PT ) that the candidate wins
maximum votes when the election is at time T is given
by Hellinger distance measure 1−H(XT , X˜p) where X˜ is
the public collective public opinion on policy p.
Hellinger distance H is given by[17]
H2(f, g) =
1
2
∫
(
√
f(t)−
√
g(t))2dt (5)
where f, g are two continuous probability density func-
tions. Because Hellinger distance is a bounded metric
on the space of probability distributions, we can directly
relate it to the probability of winning. Prop..1 is noth-
ing but a measure of how close the candidate’s perceived
opinion aligns with actual public onion at any given time,
matching of which would dictate the winning.
Based on (3) and 4, we have XT to be a Gaussian
density function and if the public stance on p can be
modeled as Gaussian, (5) reduces to
PT =
√
2σT σ˜
σ2T + σ˜
2
exp
{
−1
4
(µT − µ˜)2
σ2T + σ˜
2
}
, (6)
where σT , µT are the variance and mean of the random
variable XT and public stance = N (µ˜, σ˜). Using (6),
we can now study the effect of various parameters in the
model and its result on the probability of winning.
Based on (6), as a sanity check, we will first explore
the effect of candidates controversial take on policy p, i.e.
|µ− µ˜| >> 0. Since σT is unaffected by µ, we will assign
αT = 2σT σ˜ and βT = σ
2
T + σ˜
2, then
PT (µ)
=
√
2αT
βT
exp
{ −1
4βT
(
µ
(
1− e−rT )+ e−rTE [X0]− µ˜)2},
(7)
Which as T →∞ is a Gaussian distribution with mean
µ− µ˜, which essentially says that when every other vari-
able = 1, the maximum likelihood of winning the election
is when the public and candidate have the same stance
on p.
FIG. 2. PT for 0 < T < 2 when µ˜ = 1, σ˜ = 1, σ = 1 and
1 < µ < 10 for starting distribution with (a) X0 = 0 (b)
X0 = −2
Things get more interesting if we study the likelihood
of winning as a function of number of days to election.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of PT as a function of num-
ber of days from election for all quantities set to 1, except
µ, which varies from 1 to 10. As one can clearly see from
(a), for µ˜ = 1 (the majority accepted stance on policy =
1) and the candidate’s stance is far away from it µ = 10,
at T → ∞, the candidate has ≈ 0 chance of winning, as
mentioned in previous paragraph. But, when one closely
observes the figure, we see that there is an inflation point
where the candidate has the maximum likelihood to win.
This confirms a very intuitive strategy that, when you
have an unpopular opinionated candidate/policy, he is
more likely to win when announcing candidacy/stance
very close to election as the public cannot yet fully di-
gest his actual stance despite being clear due to lack of
time to assimilate. In (b), we start from an already neg-
ative perception on the candidates stance i.e. X0 = −2,
and this inflation point always survives.
Now, we focus on the effect of introducing confusion
i.e. σ, for a given stance. We will focus on T →∞ limit
for clarity as extending to finite T is straightforward.
Figure 3 (a) shows the calculated PT for various µ as
a function of σ, with µ˜ = 5 and σ˜ = 1, since we are
taking T → ∞, one should note that the initial starting
3point (X0) does not matter as we are interested in the
asymptotic behavior.
FIG. 3. PT for 0 < T < 2 when µ˜ = 1, σ˜ = 1, σ = 1 and
1 < µ < 10 for starting distribution with (a) X0 = 0 (b)
X0 = −2
We start with µ = 5 (red curve), where we have the
public stance given by N˜ (5, 1), which has the maximum
probability reaching when σ = 1, giving us that max-
imum likelihood is reached when XT |T→∞ = N˜ (5, 1).
As the candidate’s stance differs from popular stance i.e.
µ 6= µ˜ (red to green curve), his probability to win reduces.
Despite this reduction, one can still tune σ to reach the
optimal probability. This essentially dictates that when
an unpopular stance is held by a candidate, there is an
optimal noise that can be added while communicating to
public which maximizes the chances of winning. From
(a), one can also see that as µ− µ˜→∞, the effect of op-
timizing σ does not create appreciable advantage. Thus,
when a polarizing candidate is introduced, the best bet
is to be extremely confusing about the stance and very
little is to be gained by optimizing σ.
Polar opinions : One important use case of the above
formulation is when there is a binary stance by the public
on a policy. For instance, there can be scenarios where
the public opinion on a policy p is given by x˜ ∈ {−1, 1}
while the candidate can have his stance x ∈ (−∞,∞).
We now have the random variable X ∈ (−∞,∞), which
the public perceive as the candidate’s stance, based on
which at election time (T ), public makes the choice X˜T
based on candidate’s perceived stance XT , given by
X˜T =
{
+1 if XT > 0,
−1 if XT < 0.
(8)
Equation 12 says that, at the election date, the pub-
lic makes the decision based on the candidate’s posi-
tive/negative stance on the policy, irrespective how how
strong or weak the stance is. Following the phonological
model, the important quantity to calculate is the proba-
bility kernel of (1), which is given by
P(t, x, y)
=
1√
piσ2 (1− e−2rt) /r exp
{
− (y − µ− (x− µ)e
−rt)2
σ2 (1− e−2rt) /r
}
,
(9)
where P is the probability kernel for X to reach y
from x in time t with µ, σ being the mean and spread
of candidate’s stance. Using (9), one can calculate the
ideal time to start the election[18]. We will illustrate
this with an example where we know that the majority
favors +1 i.e. µ˜ = +1 and σ˜ = 0 (this information can be
extracted from public polls etc. ). In this case, we first
need to calculate the probability (P †(t, x)) for a point x
to reach y > 0 in a time t,
P †(t, x) =
∫ ∞
0
P(t, x, y)dy
= 1− 1
2
erfc
(
−
√
r (−µ− (−µ+ x) e−rt)
σ
√
1− e−2rt
)
(10)
Figure 4(a) shows P †(t, x) for µ = σ = r = 1. This is
the probability that a person who thinks that the can-
didate’s stance is x would choose X˜t = 1, qt time t.
Thus under the assumption that majority favors +1, this
would guarantee that the person is voting for the candi-
date. Using P †(t, x), we can now calculate exactly how
long to wait for the election for various starting points.
For example, if we know that at this given moment t = 0,
the public perceives the stance of candidate to be f(x)
where f(x) := N (µ0, σ0), then the probability that they
reach +1 at time t is given by
(11)P ′(t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x)P †(t, x)dx.
This is easy to Figure 4(a), as we integrate out x,
sampling from the points where we start i.e. N (µ0, σ0)
(shown in black line (a)). We show P ′(t) in (b) for var-
ious starting point µ0. It is clear that when the public
perceives the candidate to be on the negative side, there
is a huge advantage to wait (assuming the public stance
4FIG. 4. PT for 0 < T < 2 when µ˜ = 1, σ˜ = 1, σ = 1 and
1 < µ < 10 for starting distribution with (a) X0 = 0 (b)
X0 = −2
on policy is positive µ˜ = +1 ) while the inverse is true if
they perceive him to be on the positive side. Although
we discussed the case for majority favors +1, this can
easily be extended to −1.
Finally, (1) can be used as a base to model and study
other intricate effects. For instance one can study effect
of sudden impact full negative/positive news by simply
adding terms to (1) to include jump process which can
be analyzed numerically. Recent work by Brody et al.
[19] showed that Fake news can be modeled by adding a
noise with non-zero drift.
Even though all previous discussions pertained to sin-
gle policy, one can easily generalize this model to ac-
commodate multiple policy by increasing the dimension-
ality of the random variable. This is important be-
cause public decide between candidates based on number
of different policies that are both quantifiable and non
quantifiable. Subconsciously, these stances are mapped
into an overall score, and the public at the end votes
for the candidate with the highest score. Similar to
(1), one can define the n−dimensional OU process with
Xt = (X
1
t , X
2
t , . . . , X
n
t ) which are random variables for
policies p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) satisfying
dXit =
∑
k
Rik
(
Mk −Xkt
)
dt+
∑
l
ΣildWlt, t > 0,
(12)
where R and Σ are n × n matrices and M is a n × 1
matrix while Wt is a vector of n independent Brownian
motions and repeated. Formal solution of (12) is given
by time dependent Gaussian vector[20]
Summery : In this work, we have developed a quan-
titative phenomenological model to understand the effect
of uncertainty in information flow in elections. This offers
a initial model upon which complexities can be adorned
to quantitatively analyze the effects of isolated variables,
which helps in quantitative strategizing of election cam-
paigns. Further, we showed the existence of situations
where ineffective information flow can be advantageous.
Finally, we noted that this formalism, although devel-
oped for single policy study, can be extended to multiple
policies and is still analytically tractable.
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